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TAKING SUPREMACY SERIOUSLY:  
THE CONTRARIETY OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITIES 
Donald L. Doernberg*
INTRODUCTION 
 
Immunities from suit, whether for governments or government officials, 
occupy a semi-sacred place in our jurisprudence.  Trumpeting sovereign 
immunity,1 state and federal governments have long asserted that they are 
not subject to suit unless they have consented, and the courts have 
supported them.  The U.S. Supreme Court has also created common law 
immunities for government officials and municipalities.  Both kinds of 
immunity rest on a pervasive misunderstanding of English legal history and 
a convenient disinclination to consider the distinctive history and political 
philosophy that underlies the federal government.  This Article does not 
examine the nuances of the official and municipal immunity doctrines, but 
rather questions their legitimacy in light of constitutional supremacy.2
The remaining three parts of this Article elaborate the thesis that neither 
English legal history, the United States Constitution, nor the political 
philosophy that underlies it offers any support for the common law 
immunities from civil damages that the Supreme Court has created for 
officials and municipalities that violate constitutional rights.  Because these 
immunities descended from the concept of sovereign immunity, Part I 
discusses that concept.  Part I.A addresses the political philosophy that 
formed the foundation of the American government.  It also briefly 
canvasses what sovereign immunity has meant in England—at least since 
the time of Edward I in the late thirteenth century—where its monarchs are 
  It 
focuses on immunity of executive department officials and municipalities, 
but casts some doubt on judicial immunity as well. 
 
*  Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.  B.A., Yale University 1966; J.D., 
Columbia University 1969.  I am honored to acknowledge the wise criticism and valuable 
suggestions that Professor Susan Bandes offered on an earlier draft.  I gratefully 
acknowledge the fine research and editing assistance of Pace University law students 
Meghan Marshall, J.D. 2010, Tanya Manderson and Monika Urbanowicz, J.D. 2011, Lauren 
Bachtel and Kerriann Stout, J.D. Candidates 2013, as well as David MacIsaac, J.D. 
Candidate 2013 at Georgetown Law School.  I am very grateful for the meticulous work and 
valuable editing suggestions of the editors of the Fordham Law Review; they reminded me 
once again how much I gain from the students with whom I am privileged to work.  I am 
indebted to Professor Ronald Dworkin, who long ago powerfully urged us all to keep our 
eyes on the legal supremacy ball. 
 1. “A government’s immunity from being sued in its own courts without its consent.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 818 (9th ed. 2009). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
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immune in their persons, but where subjects suffering violation of their 
rights at government hands have always had effective remedies, either 
against the Crown by way of the petition of right or against Crown officials 
in ordinary actions for damages.  Part I.B then reviews sovereign immunity 
in the United States, contrasting it with its English forbear. 
Part II discusses officials’ and municipalities’ immunities.  Part II.A 
considers the English practice and shows that Crown officials enjoyed no 
immunity from suit for unlawful actions undertaken in the name of the 
Crown.  Part II.B reviews immunity in the United States.  It notes that the 
original Constitution did contain one immunity—for federal legislators3
This Article concludes that the Court has led itself astray with its 
immunity doctrines.  It argues that the Court’s supposition of immunities 
flies in the face of the intense interest in the former colonies in having a bill 
of rights appended to the Constitution as quickly as possible after 
ratification.  Finally, it points out that the Court’s doctrines condone and 
protect official disobedience to constitutional commands establishing 
individual rights and suggests that by so doing, the doctrines negate 
constitutional supremacy and undermine the rule of law. 
—
but no others.  As Part II.B points out, that legislative immunity mirrors one 
established in England after the Glorious Revolution.  The Supreme Court 
takes the position that the other immunities that it has created also find their 
roots in England.  Part II.B questions that assumption, arguing the 
implausibility that the Framers constitutionalized only one immunity of 
many.  In fact, the other immunities did not exist in England; they are 
home-grown and constitutionally unsupportable.  Finally, Part II.C will 
examine the extension of the Court’s flawed reasoning in creating 
municipal immunities. 
I.  PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
This symposium concerns official and municipal immunities, but a brief 
discussion of sovereign immunity in the United States and England is 
necessary to set the stage.  Relations between England and its American 
colonies soured through the mid-eighteenth century; the story needs no 
repetition.  The resulting revolution was the first recorded instance of 
colonies overthrowing the colonial power and establishing their own 
government.4
 
 3. See id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.  The Eleventh Amendment, ratified in 1795, provides some 
sort of immunity-like protection to the states from being sued by individuals in federal court, 
but its contours are unclear. See infra note 225. 
  The real novelty, however, occurred after the war ended.  
 4. In the musical 1776, Benjamin Franklin remarks to John Adams, “You talk as if 
independence were the rule!  It’s never been done before!  No colony has ever broken from 
the parent stem in the history of the world!” PETER STONE & SHERMAN EDWARDS, 1776:  A 
MUSICAL PLAY (1970).  That was not the only unique thing about the American experience.  
“[T]he impartial historian would report that no government had ever been instituted on the 
basis of popular consent[.]” Peter S. Onuf, Introduction, in DECLARING INDEPENDENCE:  THE 
ORIGIN AND INFLUENCE OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING DOCUMENT ix, ix (Christian Y. Dupont & 
Peter S. Onuf eds., 2008). 
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The first attempt to create a national government was a well known flop.5  
The Articles of Confederation took effect in 1781, and within six years, 
their inadequacy caused the Americans to discard them.6
A.  The Philosophical Foundation of America and Sovereign Immunity 
in England 
 
The ensuing convention to remedy the Articles of Confederation’s flaws 
produced the Constitution, and its Preamble differs markedly from the 
Articles’ Preamble.  The latter recited that the states were creating the 
national government,7 but by 1787, “We the People” created the federal 
government.8  The state ratification conventions represented the people, not 
the states.9  Sovereignty exists in the people, not in the government.10
 
 5. See JOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA 1789-1801, at 1 (1960) (explaining that 
Americans’ “first effort, the Articles of Confederation, . . . failed to meet the urgent financial 
needs of the nation, uphold national rights abroad, and counteract the strong centrifugal 
forces at work in the United States”). 
  In 
 6. See, e.g., DONALD L. DOERNBERG, C. KEITH WINGATE & DONALD H. ZEIGLER, 
FEDERAL COURTS, FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 607 (4th ed. 2008) (“The 
colonial experience had sensitized the colonists to the problems of a strong and unresponsive 
central government.  The Articles of Confederation reflected that sensitivity too well:  they 
created so weak a central government that the nation was forced to discard it in only four 
[sic] years.”).  Professor Corwin, however, cautions us to remember that “the task before the 
Convention arose by no means exclusively from the inadequacies of the Articles of 
Confederation for ‘the exigencies of the Union’; of at least equal urgency were the questions 
which were thrust upon its attention by the shortcomings of the state governments for their 
purposes.” EDWARD S. CORWIN, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the 
Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HIST. 
REV. 511 (1925), reprinted in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY:  ESSAYS BY EDWARD S. 
CORWIN 1, 3 (Alpheus T. Mason & Gerald Garvey eds., 1964). 
 7. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, pmbl. (“Whereas the Delegates of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled . . . agree to certain articles of 
Confederation and perpetual Union . . . .”). 
 8. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208 (1882) (“Under 
our system the people, who are there [in England] called subjects, are the sovereign.”). 
 9. The ratification statements of all thirteen original states recite that the ratification is 
on behalf of the people of the state, not the state. See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1787-1870, at 25 (1894) [hereinafter 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (Delaware); id. at 44 (Pennsylvania); id. at 61 (New Jersey); id. at 
83 (Georgia); id. at 87 (Connecticut); id. at 93 (Massachusetts); id. at 121 (Maryland); id. at 
138 (South Carolina); id. at 144 (New Hampshire); id. at 144–45 (Virginia); id. at 190 (New 
York); id. at 290 (North Carolina); id. at 310 (Rhode Island).  Chief Justice Marshall, who 
was a member of the Virginia ratification convention, see CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, 
MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA:  THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO 
SEPTEMBER 1787, at 297 (1966), took great pains to emphasize this critical distinction in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403–04 (1819): 
The powers of the general government, it has been said, are delegated by the 
states, who alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in subordination to the 
states, who alone possess supreme dominion.  It would be difficult to sustain this 
proposition.  The convention which framed the constitution was indeed elected by 
the state legislatures.  But the instrument, when it came from their hands, was a 
mere proposal, without obligation, or pretensions to it. . . . 
   
[T]he people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final.  It 
required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the state governments. 
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discussing the origin of states’ sovereign immunity, however, Justice 
Holmes misunderstood that relationship: 
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a 
sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has 
been public property since before the days of Hobbes. . . .  A sovereign is 
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete 
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal 
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right 
depends.11
Holmes failed to realize that the United States did not make the 
Constitution; the Constitution made the United States.
 
12  That sequence is 
critical to understanding the proper relationship of the government to its 
charter.  Holmes’s statement is irrelevant to whether the federal 
government, the states, or either’s agents are subject to suit for 
constitutional violations.  The former colonists did not create the nation on 
the theory of Hobbes,13
 
Id. at 402–04.  In his book written nearly 200 years later, Justice Breyer emphasizes the 
same theme. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK:  A JUDGE’S VIEW 122 
(2010).  Justice Souter has also emphasized this point in the context of states’ amenability to 
suit on federal claims: 
 but rather on that of Locke, who viewed the people, 
[R]atification demonstrated that state governments were subject to a superior 
regime of law in a judicial system established, not by the State, but by the people 
through a specific delegation of their sovereign power to a National Government 
that was paramount within its delegated sphere.  When individuals sued States to 
enforce federal rights, the Government that corresponded to the “sovereign” in the 
traditional common law sense was not the State but the National Government, and 
any state immunity from the jurisdiction of the Nation’s courts would have 
required a grant from the true sovereign, the people, in their Constitution, or from 
the Congress that the Constitution had empowered. 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 153–54 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).  State 
immunity to federal law or federal claims turns the Supremacy Clause on its head.  Had the 
Framers contemplated such immunity, they would have recreated the very kind of central 
government inefficacy that destroyed the Articles of Confederation.  If the states were to 
remain immune from federal power, the Framers need not have been in Philadelphia at all. 
 10. Professor Dworkin criticized this notion “that the ‘people’ are sovereign” as 
“mean[ing] almost nothing.” RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 18 (1978).  I 
see it slightly differently from Professor Dworkin:  I think it means almost everything. 
 11. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).  Justice Holmes repeated that 
idea in The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922):  “[W]e must realize that the authority that 
makes the law is itself superior to it, and that if it consents to apply to itself the rules that it 
applies to others the consent is free and may be withheld.” Id. at 432.  That may be true with 
respect to a statute passed by the legislature, but it cannot apply to a constitutional right 
established by the people.  Congress can enact laws that do not allow recovery against the 
federal government for violations of them.  Government liability founded upon a statute 
rather than the Constitution is different.  Congress lacks the power to exempt the government 
or its agents from constitutional obedience. 
 12. Cf. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:  Sovereign Immunity, 77 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1963) (“[Holmes’s] theory, even if analytically possible, clearly does 
not express either the moral or psychological premises of the Middle Ages.  Nor does it 
adequately account for the law as it existed when he wrote, or as it exists today.”). 
 13. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Oxford Univ. Press 1909) (1651).  
Hobbes’s Leviathan was an absolute ruler, who “knows no terms, limits or conditions, and 
. . . recognizes no other source of authority.” DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
OR THE RULE OF LAW:  THE NEW FEDERALISM’S CHOICE 26 (2005). 
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not the government, as sovereign.14  Whereas Hobbes and Filmer15 saw 
creation of the civil state as the people’s irrevocable alienation of 
sovereignty, Locke characterized legitimate government as trustee of the 
people’s sovereign power, which they could withdraw if government 
breached the trust.  The idea that a government—created by the people 
through a constitution—could exempt itself from obedience to or liability 
under that constitution would have struck Locke as both laughable and 
extraordinarily menacing.16  It would have been the antithesis of 
government by consent, which lay at the heart of Locke’s philosophy.17
Why should anyone have thought sovereign immunity was consistent 
with the American constitutional system?  The Constitution has only two 
purposes:  to create government and to restrain it.  Sovereign immunity, 
however, permits the government to cast off the Constitution’s restraints 
with impunity.  It demonstrates that government is not subject to the law.  It 
violates Article VI’s declaration that “[t]his Constitution . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land,”
  
The cognitive dissonance would have been unbearable (as it should be 
today).  The government was supposed to be the people’s trustee, not their 
master. 
18
What is worse, the model does not even properly reflect English practice.  
English legal history is replete with instances of individuals obtaining relief 
against wrongs done in the name of the Crown: 
 by placing government conduct beyond the 
reach of that “supreme law.”  In Locke’s terms, it permits the trustee to 
violate the terms of the trust.  Perhaps the strangest thing about sovereign 
immunity in America is that it imports the monarchical model of 
government that the colonists fought a war to throw off. 
Magna Carta ma[de] clear that early thirteenth-century English society 
expected the king and all his officers to act consistently with the law of 
the land, and it provided a remedy for their failure to do so.  
 
 14. See DOERNBERG, supra note 13, at 63–70. See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1963) (1690). 
 15. See generally ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS (Johann P. 
Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1680). 
 16. This also demonstrates the weakness of Justice Holmes’s statement.  Jean Bodin was 
the first political thinker to articulate the idea of a single, immutable power source, see 
generally JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY (Julian H. Franklin ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1992) (1576), and Hobbes further elaborated that view, see generally HOBBES, supra note 13.  
The point upon which Justice Holmes relied is precisely the concept that the colonists 
rejected by adopting Locke’s theory. 
 17. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. VIII, § 95 (1690), 
reprinted in LOCKE, supra note 14, at 283, 365 (“Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all 
free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the 
Political Power of another, without his own Consent.  The only way whereby any one divests 
himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with 
other Men to joyn and unite into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable 
living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security 
against any that are not of it. . . .  When any number of Men have so consented to make one 
Community or Government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one Body 
Politick, wherein the Majority have a Right to act and conclude the rest.”). 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
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Representative lords were entitled to petition the king for redress and, if 
the king failed to make good the wrong done, were entitled to raise the 
populace against him to secure redress.  Although the king’s and his 
family’s persons were inviolate, royal property was not.19
During the reign of Edward I, the aggrieved subject could petition the 
King for relief.  The ability to sue the Crown was “an uncontested point.”
 
20  
Under the legal theory of the day, such suits depended on the King’s 
consent:  “The petition of right asked the Crown to submit itself to the laws 
that applied to private persons.  With the standard notation, ‘Let right be 
done,’ the King usually endorsed such petitions.”21
“[U]sually” is particularly important in English law.  After all, the 
English Constitution is unwritten; it is the collection of governmental 
powers, limitations, and practices that have accumulated over the 
centuries.
 
22  Where custom was the law, the king’s practice of “seldom 
openly defy[ing] a request for justice simply on the ground that he had the 
power to do what he pleased” meant English law provided remedies for 
wrongs done in the King’s name.23  So, merely to state that the government 
is not suable without its consent, as Hamilton24 and Madison25 did, strips 
the theory from historical practice.26
 
 19. DOERNBERG, supra note 13, at 71 (citing MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (Eng. 1215), 
translated and reprinted in JAMES C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA app. 6, at 448, 471 (2d ed. 
1992)). 
  In England, consent was routinely 
forthcoming. 
 20. Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriation Power and Sovereign Immunity, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1212 (2009). 
 21. Id. at 1213.  The phrase used was “soit fait droit.” Ludwik Ehrlich, Proceedings 
Against the Crown (1216–1377), in 6 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY pt. 
XII, at 97 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1921). 
 22. See, e.g., Jack Beatson, Reforming an Unwritten Constitution, 126 LAW Q. REV. 48, 
48 (2010) (“It differs from many others in not being embodied in a written document but in a 
complex mixture of institutional practices; that is, of history, custom, tradition, and politics 
reflected in conventions, procedures, and protocols as well as within the body of statute and 
common law.”). 
 23. Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 26.  Remedies lay for disseisin, for a “wrong inflicted by a 
sheriff, or a bailiff, or even the exchequer” by summoning the derelict official before the 
exchequer for an inquiry into the lawfulness of his behavior, which might result in an order 
to desist. Id. at 28. 
 24. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548–49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an 
individual without its consent.  This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; 
and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government 
of every state in the union.”).  Hamilton, however, did not address the question of where 
sovereignty itself (as distinguished from its attributes) lies in the United States. 
 25. See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881) (recording Madison’s 
argument at the Virginia ratifying convention that the Constitution did not give any 
individual the right “to call any state into court”). 
 26. See WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 251 
(London, W. Green 1817) (1783) (“In the British, and possibly in all other constitutions, 
there exists a wide difference between the actual state of the government and the theory.  
The one results from the other; but still they are different.  When we contemplate the theory 
of the British government, we see the king invested with the most absolute personal 
impunity . . . .  Yet, when we turn our attention from the legal existence, to the actual 
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B.  Sovereign Immunity in the United States 
It is therefore too facile simply to assert that sovereign immunity was the 
rule without looking at the practice.27  The norm in England was that some 
form of remedy existed.28
Irrespective of its philosophical and political illegitimacy, the concept of 
sovereign immunity has long roots in the United States.  In United States v. 
Lee,
  Thus, sovereign immunity in the United States 
suffers ultimately from three defects:  (1) it misidentifies the sovereign in a 
way that repudiates the political philosophy that underlay the American 
revolution, (2) it borrows an English monarchical model of government, 
and (3) it fails even to borrow the model correctly. 
29 referring to Chief Justice Marshall’s unquestioning recognition of 
that principle,30 the Supreme Court noted that such immunity “has always 
been treated as an established doctrine” even though “the principle has 
never been discussed or the reasons for it given.”31  There is good reason 
that it had never been discussed:  the political philosophy of sovereign 
immunity did not transfer to the United States.  Pretending that it did 
ignores the English practice of several hundred years and imposes the 
mistake on the American constitutional system.  Lee cautioned against 
relying heavily on English sovereign immunity precedent for two reasons.  
First, English courts at law had little opportunity to address the issue 
because of the effectiveness of the alternative petition of right.32  Second, 
“of much greater weight,” was “the vast difference in the essential character 
of the two governments as regards the source and depositaries of power.”33
 
exercise of royal authority in England, we see these formidable prerogatives dwindled into 
mere ceremonies . . . .”). 
  
Having expounded the lack of a philosophical foundation for English 
 27. Ironically, this calls to mind Justice Holmes’s famous aphorism:  “The life of the law 
has not been logic:  it has been experience.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON 
LAW 1 (1881).  Holmes’s further explanation that “the prevalent moral and political theories” 
and “the story of a nation’s development” often “had a good deal more to do than the 
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed” was equally revealing. 
Id. 
 28. The remedy was not always in the form of damages.  The struggle for financial 
supremacy between king and parliament routinely left the king short of cash. See generally 
Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 20, at 1217–29 (discussing the struggle and how it ended “‘in 
favour of parliamentary supremacy’”) (quoting E.A. Reitan, The Civil List in Eighteenth-
Century British Politics:  Parliamentary Supremacy Versus the Independence of the Crown, 
9 HIST. J. 318, 337 (1966)).  Therefore, where equitable relief was not possible, the practice 
was for the king to make a non-monetary grant of some sort to the wronged subject, whether 
of “land, avowdsons, liberties, [or] rights to hold markets; in short, anything rather than hard 
cash.” Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 32. 
 29. 106 U.S. 196 (1882). 
 30. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821) (“This general 
proposition [sovereign immunity] will not be controverted.”). 
 31. Lee, 106 U.S. at 207 (citing Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 380). 
 32. Id. at 208.  Lee noted that the petition of right often eliminated the need to sue 
Crown officials, id., because the Crown was the deep pocket.  Eight decades before Lee, 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), had noted, “In Great Britain the king 
himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with the 
judgment of his court.” Id. at 163. 
 33. Lee, 106 U.S. at 208. 
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sovereign immunity in the United States, where no person exercises full 
sovereign power,34 Lee nonetheless implicitly relied on that theory.  It 
concluded that, there being no sovereign executive power, only Congress 
could consent to suit against the federal government.35
Professor Louis Jaffe commented extensively on what one might call the 
myth of sovereign immunity: 
  It borrowed the 
principle without the principal upon whom it depended, importing 
sovereign immunity without its corresponding remedial system. 
Perhaps the question has been not whether the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity was “right” but whether as a practical matter it ever has existed.  
From time immemorial many claims affecting the Crown could be 
pursued in the regular courts if they did not take the form of a suit against 
the Crown.  And when it was necessary to sue the Crown eo nomine 
consent apparently was given as of course.  Long before 1789 it was true 
that sovereign immunity was not a bar to relief.  Where the doctrine was 
in form applicable the subject had to proceed by petition of right, a 
cumbersome, dilatory remedy to be sure, but nevertheless a remedy.  If 
the subject was the victim of illegal official action, in many cases he 
could sue the King’s officers for damages.  And the writs of certiorari, 
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus ran against many official 
boards and commissions, though until recent times we do not find cases 
where they have run against the King’s high secretaries of state.  This was 
the situation in England at the time the American Constitution was 
drafted.36
In what Professor Jaffe termed “a magnificent irony,”
 
37 the new 
American states believed that in the absence of an individual sovereign, 
consent to suit was not possible as it had been under the Crown.  Therefore, 
the power to consent passed mystically to the state and federal legislatures, 
which took “many years to authorize suit.”38
The irony is greater than Professor Jaffe imagined.  The most important 
cause of the American Revolution was the colonists’ belief that England 
was denying them the rights of Englishmen.  All of their other grievances 
resembled a bill of particulars explicating that general dissatisfaction.
 
39
 
 34. See id. at 206 (“As no person in this government exercises supreme executive power, 
or performs the public duties of a sovereign, it is difficult to see on what solid foundation of 
principle the exemption from liability to suit rests.”). 
  
 35. Id. at 205–06.  It may have been this sort of reasoning that caused Professor Davis to 
remark that “[h]ardly any other branch of Supreme Court law is so permeated with sophistry 
as the law of sovereign immunity.” KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 27.04, 
at 501 (3d ed. 1972). 
 36. Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1–2 (second emphasis added). 
 37. Id. at 2. 
 38. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 35. 
 39. See PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION:  COLONIAL RADICALS AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN, 1765-1776, at 245 (1972) (noting 
James Madison’s hope in 1774 that “a ‘Bill of Rights’ might be adopted by Congress and 
confirmed by the King or Parliament, such that America’s liberties would be ‘as firmly 
fixed, and defined as those of England were at the [glorious] revolution.’” (quoting Letter 
from James Madison to William Bradford (Aug. 1, 1774), in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 118 (William T. Hutchinson & William M. Rachel eds., 1962)).  Madison’s 
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Yet, the American form of sovereign immunity created a system of official 
accountability even less protective of individual rights vis-à-vis government 
than the English system the colonists had thrown off because it denied them 
those rights.40
Although Alexander Hamilton endorsed sovereign immunity in one of 
his Federalist papers,
 
41
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every 
act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under 
which it is exercised, is void.  No legislative act therefore contrary to the 
constitution can be valid.  To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy 
is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the 
representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that 
men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not 
authorise, but what they forbid.
 he had said something quite different in another, 
published only a few days earlier, when discussing constitutional 
supremacy: 
42
This statement, often cited as supporting judicial review,
 
43
 
comment underscores the colonists’ feeling that England was denying them the fundamental 
rights of Englishmen: 
 also 
powerfully reflects John Locke’s influence:  (1) the United States 
Whether the Crown could—or could not—alter colonial rights and privileges 
established through usage and founded on either custom or the colonists’ inherited 
rights as English people was certainly the most divisive issue separating 
metropolis and colonies during the seven decades following the Glorious 
Revolution.  That issue was at the heart of the recurring controversies over the 
applicability of English law in the colonies and the status of the colonial 
assemblies. 
JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 18 (2011). 
 40. See, e.g., Onuf, supra note 4, at x (describing “rebellious colonists who had taken up 
arms to vindicate their rights as Englishmen and who hoped to redeem their mother country 
and its empire from corruption and incipient despotism.”).  In fact, the colonists originally 
took to arms to regain their English rights, rather than to create new rights protected by a 
new American government. See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE:  MAKING THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 17–30 (1997) (describing the repeatedly expressed desire of 
the colonists to mend relations with England rather than separate from it); Onuf, supra note 
4, at x (“The colonists originally resorted to violence because they were Britons, not because 
they were ‘Americans.’”); see also GREENE, supra note 39, at 8 (“For English people 
migrating overseas to establish new communities of settlement, the capacity to enjoy—to 
possess—the English system of law and liberty was thus crucial to their ability to maintain 
their identity as English people and to continue to think of themselves and be thought of as 
English. . . .  ‘[T]he attempt to establish English law and the rights and liberties of 
Englishmen was constant from the first settlement to the [American] Revolution’ and 
beyond.” (quoting GEORGE DARGO, ROOTS OF THE REPUBLIC:  A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON EARLY 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 58 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 41. See supra note 24. 
 42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 24, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton).  It seems a fair 
inference that Hamilton would have applied this reasoning to the other two branches of 
government as well. 
 43. See, e.g., Jack Wade Nowlin, Conceptualizing the Dangers of the “Least 
Dangerous” Branch:  A Typology of Judicial Constitutional Violation, 39 CONN. L. REV. 
1211, 1218 (2007) (referring to Hamilton’s defense of judicial review as “canonical”); 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkrantz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1221 
n.32 (2010). 
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government possesses only delegated, not inherent, power; (2) the 
government can never legitimately violate the Constitution; and (3) the 
government is the deputy—the servant—of the people.  Had Hamilton said 
“trustee”44 instead of “servant,” he might have been accused of plagiarizing 
Locke.45
When the Constitutional Convention met, the maxim ubi jus ibi 
remedium reigned.
 
46  Chief Justice Marshall went out of his way to make 
that point in Marbury v. Madison.47  First, he quoted Blackstone:  “‘[I]t is a 
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a 
legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.’”48  
Then, he penned one of the most famous lines in American jurisprudence:  
“The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws, and not of men.  It will certainly cease to deserve this 
high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested 
legal right.”49  It is senseless to speak of a right for which there is no 
remedy.50  Yet, the effect of an immunity is “freedom from the legal power 
or ‘control’ of another as regards some legal relation.”51
 
 44. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
  Thus, immunities 
insulate one from the law’s remedy.  If there is no remedy, there is no right; 
 45. Jefferson had suffered that exact accusation after writing the Declaration of 
Independence. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 30, 1823), in 3 
The REPUBLIC OF LETTERS:  THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES 
MADISON 1776–1826, at 1875, 1876 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) (“Richard Henry Lee 
charged it as copied from Locke’s treatise on government.”).  Jefferson denied it in a letter to 
Madison:  “I know only that I turned to neither book or pamphlet while writing it.” Id. 
 46. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 24, at 95 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is 
essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty 
or punishment for disobedience.  If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the 
resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will in fact amount to nothing more than 
advice or recommendation.”).  Hamilton also noted that without effective remedies for 
violations of the law, everything would devolve to the “execution by the sword.” Id.  “Such a 
state of things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent 
man choose to commit his happiness to it.” Id. at 96. 
 47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 48. Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23). 
 49. Id.  The idea was certainly not original with Marshall; Chief Justice Holt of the 
King’s bench had expressed the same thought a century earlier: 
If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and 
maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and 
indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for . . . want of right 
and want of remedy are reciprocal. 
Ashby v. White, (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B.) 136; 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953. 
 50. See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 207 (9th ed. 1952) (“The proclamation in a constitution or charter of the right 
to personal freedom, or indeed of any other right, gives of itself but slight security that the 
right has more than a nominal existence, and students who wish to know how far the right to 
freedom of person is in reality part of the law of the constitution must consider both what is 
the meaning of the right and, a matter of even more consequence, what are the legal methods 
by which its exercise is secured.”). 
 51. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 55 (1913). 
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there is merely a hope, wish, or aspiration.52  In the context of the present 
discussion, sovereign immunities grant the government “freedom from the 
legal power or ‘control’ of”53
II.  OFFICIAL AND MUNICIPAL IMMUNITIES 
 the Constitution, the document designed both 
to create and to control that government.  The Constitution’s recognition of 
individual “rights” against the power of the government becomes a hollow 
mockery. 
A.  English Practice 
And what of the King’s officials?  The well-known but oft-misconstrued 
phrase “the King can do no wrong” controlled their liability: 
[O]riginally [it] meant precisely the contrary to what it later came to 
mean.  “[I]t meant that the king must not, was not allowed, not entitled, to 
do wrong . . . .”  It was on that basis that the King, though not suable in 
his court (since it seemed an anomaly to issue a writ against oneself), 
nevertheless endorsed on petitions “let justice be done,” thus empowering 
his courts to proceed.54
Accordingly, no wrongful act by a Crown official was attributable to the 
King.
 
55  If the King’s official committed a tort, it was no defense that he 
acted for the Crown.56  Feather v. The Queen57
 
 52. See generally Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies:  A New Approach to the 
Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 677–78 (1987). 
 cemented that 
 53. Hohfeld, supra note 51, at 55. 
 54. Jaffe, supra note 12, at 4 (second alteration in original) (quoting Erlich, supra note 
21, at 42); see also James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition:  Toward 
a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 899, 901 (1997) (pointing out that Blackstone described this petition process).  
Professor Pfander quotes Blackstone’s elaboration of the phrase, which bears repeating: 
“That the king can do no wrong, is a necessary and fundamental principle of the 
English constitution:  meaning only, . . . that in the first place, whatever may be 
amiss in the conduct of public affairs is not chargeable personally on the king . . . ; 
and, secondly, that the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injury . . . .  
Whenever therefore it happens, that, by misinformation or inadvertence, the crown 
hath been induced to invade the private rights of any of its subjects, though no 
action will lie against the sovereign, . . . yet the law hath furnished the subject with 
a decent and respectful mode of removing that invasion, by informing the king of 
the true state of the matter in dispute:  and, as it presumes that to know of an injury 
and to redress it are inseparable in the royal breast, it then issues as of course, in 
the king’s own name, his orders to his judges to do justice to the party aggrieved.” 
Id. at 901 n.6 (alterations in original) (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 48, at *254–55). 
 55. DICEY, supra note 50, at 25 (“[N]o one can plead the orders of the Crown or indeed 
of any superior officer in defence of any act not otherwise justifiable by law . . . .”). 
 56. 6 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 266–67 (1927) (“It was 
well recognized that no tort could be imputed to the crown, because the king could do no 
wrong.  It was also fully recognized after the [Glorious] Revolution [of 1689] that all 
servants of the crown were personally responsible for torts committed by them, even though 
they had been in fact committed on the instructions of the crown.”).  This is reminiscent of 
the construction of the Fourth Amendment that the defendants in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), unsuccessfully urged 
on the Court, which Justice Brennan’s majority opinion summarized this way: 
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understanding,58 but long before that, Crown officials who violated the law 
were liable in tort.  For example, “[a]s against sheriffs and inferior 
ministers, persons who claimed to be wrongly imprisoned had the remedies 
of de homine replegiando (to secure release) or false imprisonment (to 
recover damages).”59
Magna Carta and its requirement of adherence to the “law of the land”
 
60 
gave rise to those rules.61  Sir Edward Coke traced the condemnation of 
misuse of official power to that document:  “[I]f any man by colour of any 
authority, where he hath not any in that particular case, arrest, or imprison 
any man, or cause him to be arrested, or imprisoned, this is against this Act, 
and it is most hatefull, when it is done by countenance of Justice.”62  He 
emphasized that Magna Carta was supreme law and other laws had to be 
consistent with it, as the Crown had recognized.63
B.  American Practice 
 
The Constitution does establish one official immunity.  The Speech and 
Debate Clause64 immunizes members of Congress with respect to 
legislative activities.65
 
[T]he Fourth Amendment would serve merely to limit the extent to which the 
agents could defend the state law tort suit by asserting that their actions were a 
valid exercise of federal power:  if the agents were shown to have violated the 
Fourth Amendment, such a defense would be lost to them and they would stand 
before the state law merely as private individuals. 
  The Constitution prescribes no other official 
Id. at 390–91. 
 57. (1865) 122 Eng. Rep. 1191 (Q.B.); 6 B. & S. 257. 
 58. Id. at 1205; 6 B. & S. at 296 (“As the Sovereign cannot authorize wrong to be done, 
the authority of the Crown would afford no defence to an action brought for an illegal act 
committed by an officer of the Crown.”). 
 59. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 473 (4th ed. 2002). 
 60. MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39 (Eng. 1215), translated and reprinted in HOLT, supra note 19, 
app. 6, at 461. 
 61. One is apt to think of Magna Carta in constitutional terms, but it is not the British 
Constitution, although many of the ideas contained within it are part of the British 
Constitution and, according to Sir Edward Coke, even antedate Magna Carta. EDWARD 
COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1642), reprinted in 
2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 745, 750 (Steve Sheppard 
ed., 2003) (referring to Magna Carta and other documents of agreement between the 
monarch and the lords as “for the most part, but declaratories of the ancient Common Laws 
of England, to the observation, and keeping whereof, the King was bound and sworn.”).  The 
American concept of due process of law and many other rights in the Constitution trace back 
to Magna Carta’s words.  In examining Magna Carta’s language, Coke noted that “[u]pon 
this Chapter, as out of a roote, many fruitful branches of the Law of England have sprung,” 
id. at 848, including the rights of due process of law, see id. at 849, trial by jury, id. at 849, 
854–55, 857, indictment or presentment, id. at 858, and confrontation, id. at 856.  All of 
these rights became part of the American Bill of Rights. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.  
This is hardly surprising since the critical issue that drove the colonies away from England 
was whether the colonists had all the rights of Englishmen residing in England or whether 
the Crown had acquired greater prerogative with respect to them than it had over its 
domestic subjects. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 62. COKE, supra note 61, at 867. 
 63. See id. at 867–70. 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 65. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501, 507–08 (1975). 
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immunity.66  Referring to legislative immunity, Tenney v. Brandhove67 
noted that “[t]he provision in the United States Constitution was a reflection 
of political principles already firmly established in the states,”68 and traced 
it to “taproots in the Parliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries.”69
First, immunities might have been so well established that the Framers 
felt no need to include them.  If the other immunities did exist at common 
law, and the Framers intended to leave them in place, that raises the 
uncomfortable question of why the Framers picked out one immunity for 
explicit constitutional protection and left the others unstated.  That flies in 
the face of the well-known maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
  One might have expected, if official immunities 
generally were well established, that the Framers would have included them 
in the Constitution as well.  They did not, however, and the question is why 
not.  There are several possibilities. 
70 
and there is no reason to believe that the Framers abandoned such 
reasoning.  The Necessary and Proper Clause71 and the Ninth 
Amendment72 implicitly recognize the maxim.  The former specifies that 
the enumeration of congressional powers in Article I is not exclusive; the 
latter does the same with respect to the enumeration of rights in the first 
eight Amendments.73
 
 66. The only suggestion that sovereign immunity has other textual roots in the 
Constitution has come from Professors Figley and Tidmarsh. See generally Figley & 
Tidmarsh, supra note 20.  They argued that the Appropriations Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 7, provides the constitutional underpinning for sovereign immunity because 
Congress, by refusing to appropriate money to satisfy a judgment, would effectively make 
the government immune, see Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 20, at 1259.  I see it differently.  
Congress’s refusal would repudiate the rule of law and implicitly deny the federal judiciary’s 
power to adjudicate constitutional questions, all of which involve the power, prerogative, 
and behavior of government.  When the Framers drafted the Appropriations Clause, they 
sought to keep power out of the hands of the executive branch, not to immunize the 
government from constitutional obedience. See id. at 1210 (“[T]he Clause was a political 
given.  Its ‘power of the purse’ was intended as the counterweight to the President’s ‘power 
of the sword.’”).  Professors Figley and Tidmarsh assert that “[i]t is only a small, and logical, 
step from constitutionally commanded legislative control over disbursements from the purse 
to constitutionally commanded legislative control over private claims against the purse.” Id. 
at 1259.  That conclusion rests on an unspoken and unsupportable premise:  that Congress 
can create sovereign immunity by simply refusing to appropriate money to pay judgments 
supposes that Congress will refuse to recognize judicial determination of individuals’ 
constitutional rights.  Congress thus would become complicit in the executive branch’s 
violation.  The Constitution, however, gives individuals rights against government.  Those 
rights bind the government—the entire government, including Congress.  Professors Figley 
and Tidmarsh’s interpretation of the Appropriations Clause makes individuals’ constitutional 
rights subordinate to Congress in all matters having to do with federal money.  I submit that 
it is a very large and illogical step. 
 
 67. 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
 68. Id. at 373. 
 69. Id. at 372. 
 70. “A canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the 
exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009).  
 71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 72. Id. amend. IX. 
 73. The prevalence of the kind of legal thinking that expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
exemplifies caused objection in the Constitutional Convention when it discussed a bill of 
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Second, immunities might have been well established, but the Framers 
deliberately omitted all but legislative immunity from the Constitution.  
Perhaps the common law immunities existed, and the Framers decided to 
exclude them and retain only the legislative immunity that English law had 
codified.74  Although they did not specify that they were abandoning them, 
codifying bodies do not commonly mention rules or principles that they are 
not adopting.  Remember that the Constitution is a document of enumerated 
powers and mandated restrictions.  It contains nothing like a reception 
provision, and there is no federal reception statute.  Federal law began with 
the Constitution, and all federal law flows from it.75
Third, the immunity principles (that the Supreme Court assumes) may 
not have existed at all.
 
76  Although the Court keeps asserting that these 
immunities existed, they may not have.  That is consistent with the 
Constitution’s specification of only legislators’ immunity.  The English had 
explicitly established it nearly a century earlier.77
The Supreme Court has adopted the first possibility, which seems the 
least plausible.  Notably, it has not accorded constitutional status to any of 
the immunities it has recognized.
 
78  Instead, it has reasoned backward from 
a cost-benefit analysis to the unsupported assumption that the Framers 
intended to retain such immunities.79
The prospect of utilitarian gains cannot justify preventing a man from 
doing what he has a right to do, and the supposed gains in respect for law 
  This undisguised, self-proclaimed 
utilitarian analysis causes some individual constitutional rights to be 
unenforceable when government violates them.  Such results are 
irreconcilable with constitutional supremacy: 
 
rights.  The concern was that having the Constitution explicitly guarantee some rights would 
imply that the list was exclusive. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 74. See An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the 
Succession of the Crown, 1688, 1 W. & M., 2d Sess., c. 2, § 9 (Eng.). 
 75. One must take that sentence literally.  Under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 
(1842), the federal courts routinely applied principles of “general law,” a form of common 
law based upon a natural-law conception of law.  Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64 (1938), overruled Swift, recognizing the shift in jurisprudential thinking from the natural-
law model to a positivist model:  “There is no federal general common law.” Id. at 78.  The 
Court made clear that the common law the federal courts had declared and applied under the 
Swift regime could not have been federal law within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause 
when it complained that “[p]ersistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of 
common law prevented uniformity.” Id. at 74 (footnote omitted).  If the general common law 
the federal judiciary had announced had been federal law, the states would have been 
obliged to follow it, achieving the federal/state uniformity of which Justice Brandeis 
wistfully spoke. See generally Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad:  
Why History and Jurisprudence Suggest a More Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109 
W. VA. L. REV. 611 (2007). 
 76. Given the antebellum history of suits against government officials, this is the most 
probable explanation. See generally James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs 
and Private Bills:  Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862 (2010). 
 77. See supra note 74. 
 78. See infra notes 102–20 and accompanying text. 
 79. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text; see also supra note 18 and 
accompanying text. 
2011] TAKING SUPREMACY SERIOUSLY 457 
are simply utilitarian gains.  There would be no point in the boast that we 
respect individual rights unless that involved some sacrifice, and the 
sacrifice in question must be that we give up whatever marginal benefits 
our country would receive from overriding these rights when they prove 
inconvenient.80
The Court superimposes its cost-benefit balance on the Bill of Rights and 
some of the amendments that have followed it, notably the Civil War 
Amendments.  That ignores the balance the Supremacy Clause has already 
struck.  If the Court had construed constitutional rights more narrowly than 
plaintiffs wished—simply not to reach the challenged conduct—then its 
results would at least have the veneer of constitutional respectability.
 
81
Kendall v. Stokes,
  But 
it has not done that. 
82 an early official immunity case, discusses immunity 
entirely in conclusory terms.  “We are not aware of any case in England or 
in this country in which it has been held that a public officer, acting to the 
best of his judgment and from a sense of duty, in a matter of account with 
an individual, has been held liable to an action for an error of judgment.”83  
The Court articulated no policy, referring only to the “greatest mischiefs”84 
that would attend the contrary rule.  It cited Gidley v. Palmerston,85 an 
English case that declared that well-qualified people would decline public 
service if individual liability on contracts entered into on behalf of the 
government might follow.86  Gidley, however, did not regard plaintiffs as 
remediless; the Crown supplied a remedy in the form of the petition of 
right.87  Furthermore, Gidley was an assumpsit action, involving the 
government’s obligation to pay a pension that Parliament had allotted to 
military retirees, and the case it relied on was also a contract case.88
 
 80. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 193. 
  The 
American official immunities cases do not sound in contract; they are in the 
nature of tort founded on constitutional rights.  Nonetheless, they have 
borrowed heavily from the English contract cases. 
 81. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695–96, 701, 710 (1976) (disallowing a 
§ 1983 action seeking damages for a police flyer labeling plaintiff as a known shoplifter, 
even though he had no shoplifting conviction, because the Court found no Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest in reputation alone, without any attendant loss of property, right, 
or privilege). 
 82. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845). 
 83. Id. at 97–98. 
 84. Id. at 98. 
 85. (1822) 129 Eng. Rep. 1290 (C.P.); 3 Brod & B. 275; see Kendall, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 
at 98 (citing Gidley, 129 Eng. Rep. 1290; 3 Brod & B. 275). 
 86. See Gidley, 129 Eng. Rep. at 1294–95 & n.a; 3 Brod & B. at 286 & n.a (“‘No man 
would accept of any office of trust under government upon such conditions . . . .” (quoting 
Macbeath v. Haldimand, (1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B.) 1041; 1 T.R. 172, 181–82)). 
 87. Id. (“[N]o individual is answerable for any engagements which he enters into on [the 
government’s] behalf.  There is no doubt but the crown will do ample justice to the plaintiffs 
demands, if they be well founded.”). 
 88. It is significant that Gidley rested on utilitarian, not constitutional, grounds. See infra 
notes 102–32 and accompanying text. 
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Wilkes v. Dinsman89 sounded in tort,90 and the Court’s discussion of the 
protection available to the defendant is illuminating both for what it said 
and what it did not say.  Dinsman was a marine retained beyond the original 
ending date of his enlistment, pursuant to a statute.91  When Dinsman 
refused to perform his duties, Wilkes punished him by lashes and 
imprisonment, as authorized by military law.92  Dinsman asserted claims of 
trespass vi et armis, assault, battery, and false imprisonment, some of it in a 
foreign jail.93  His only constitutional claim was an Eighth Amendment 
claim with respect to the foreign confinement.94  In a tort case between 
private individuals, the plaintiff states a prima facie case by introducing 
proof of “acts of violence,” after which “the person using them must go 
forward next, and show the moderation or justification of the blows 
used.”95  A case against a public official invested with discretion, the Court 
noted, was entirely different: 
[T]he officer, being intrusted with a discretion for public purposes, is not 
to be punished for the exercise of it, unless it is first proved against him, 
either that he exercised the power confided in cases without his 
jurisdiction, or in a manner not confided to him, as with malice, cruelty, 
or wilful oppression, or, in the words of Lord Mansfield, . . . that he 
exercised it as “if the heart is wrong.”  In short, it is not enough to show 
he committed an error in judgment, but it must have been a malicious and 
wilful error.96
This is immunity but far more limited than the Supreme Court 
recognizes.  It amounts to good faith immunity—a concept the Court toyed 
with in Wood v. Strickland
 
97 and abandoned in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,98
 
 89. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89 (1849). 
 
 90. See id. at 122. 
 91. See id. at 122, 124. 
 92. See id. at 127. 
 93. See id. at 122; see also id. at 89. 
 94. See id. at 114–15. 
 95. Id. at 130. 
 96. Id. at 130–31 (quoting Wall v. McNamara, (1779) (original not available), quoted in 
Hannaford v. Hunn, (1825) 172 Eng. Rep. 68 (K.B.) 72 note; 2 Car. & P. 148, 158 note). 
 97. 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (“A compensatory award will be appropriate only if the 
school board member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such 
disregard of the student’s clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot 
reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.”).  Wood announced a standard with both 
subjective and objective components. See id. at 322 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 
557 (1967)) (holding that there was no immunity where a school board member “knew or 
reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official 
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the 
action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other 
injury to the student”). 
 98. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).  Harlow represents a considerable shift in Justice Powell’s 
perspective.  In Wood, he disliked the objective component of the majority’s standard.  He 
thought the majority’s reliance on terms like “settled, indisputable law,” Wood, 420 U.S. at 
321, and “basic, unquestioned constitutional rights,” id. at 322, was unrealistic.  “One need 
only look to the decisions of this Court—to our reversals, our recognition of evolving 
concepts, and our five-to-four splits—to recognize the hazard of even informed prophecy as 
to what are ‘unquestioned constitutional rights.’” Id. at 329 (Powell, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  In 1975, Justice Powell favored a good faith standard.  “[A]s I view 
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where it instead allowed an immunity defense except in cases involving 
violations of “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.”99
Consider the rationale supporting official immunities.  Sovereign 
immunity springs from a theory of government power,
 
100
 
it, the correct standard for qualified immunity of a government official [is]:  whether in light 
of the discretion and responsibilities of his office, and under all of the circumstances as they 
appeared at the time, the officer acted reasonably and in good faith.” Id. at 330.  By the time 
he wrote Harlow seven years later, Justice Powell had entirely reversed his field: 
 however 
[W]e conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject 
government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching 
discovery.  We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary 
functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known. 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18.  He did not explain the apparent Damascus conversion that 
occurred on the road from Wood to Harlow.  The primary effect of the shift, removing the 
element of good faith from the equation, was to deny plaintiffs discovery with respect to the 
defending official’s state of mind by making it irrelevant.  This was a startling reversal of 
both the English immunity rule, see supra note 96 and accompanying text, and the American 
practice as described in Dinsman, see supra notes 89–97 and accompanying text.  Harlow 
may be doubly surprising because there was evidence of bad faith on the part of one of the 
defendants. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 735–36 (1982) (quoting from an internal 
memorandum indicating that the White House should not rehire Fitzgerald, despite his “top-
notch” skills, but instead “should let him bleed, for a while at least” because he had “very 
low marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game.”). 
 99. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.  United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997), 
unanimously declared that Harlow intended “to give officials (and, ultimately, governments) 
the same protection from civil liability and its consequences that individuals have 
traditionally possessed in the face of vague criminal statutes.” Id. at 270–71.  The Sixth 
Circuit had reversed convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006), the criminal counterpart to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), holding that (1) only Supreme Court declarations of the 
constitutional rights that statute protects give sufficient clarity to avert a void-for-vagueness 
ruling, and (2) the charge against the defendant must rest on facts fundamentally similar to 
the Supreme Court precedents. United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1392–93 (6th Cir. 
1996) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 520 U.S. 259 (1997).  By vacating and remanding, 
the Supreme Court gave the criminal statute broader scope than had the Sixth Circuit.  “The 
question is whether this standard of notice is higher than the Constitution requires, and we 
hold that it is.” Lanier, 520 U.S. at 261. 
  Five years later, it relied on Lanier and issued a similar ruling with respect to 
qualified immunity in civil suits under Harlow’s standard. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 
739–41 (2002).  Yet, in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), the Court required 
fundamentally similar—almost identical—facts to overcome the official’s claim of qualified 
immunity to civil damages. Id. at 640–41 (reversing the circuit court’s erroneous refusal “to 
consider the argument that it was not clearly established that the circumstances with which 
Anderson was confronted did not constitute probable cause and exigent circumstances” even 
though “it was firmly established that warrantless searches not supported by probable cause 
and exigent circumstances violate the Fourth Amendment” (second emphasis added)).  
Although Creighton antedated Pelzer, the Court returned to the fact-specific Creighton 
approach in Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004), two years after Pelzer:  “It is 
important to emphasize that this inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context 
of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198 (quoting Saucier 
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).  Saucier also relied specifically on Creighton. See 
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201–02 (citing Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640).  Accordingly, there is a 
plausible argument that officials faced with possible civil liability for constitutional 
violations get more protection than they would if faced with criminal charges for the same 
violations. 
 100. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
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inapplicable it may be to the United States.101  That is not true for official 
immunities.  None rest on political or constitutional philosophy.  They rest 
on arguments like the government-function or over-deterred-officials 
arguments, discussed below.  All are theories of expediency;102 the Court 
engages openly and unashamedly in cost-benefit analysis.  In Professor 
Dworkin’s terms, arguments of policy try to overcome arguments of 
principle.103  According to Professor Tribe, arguments of policy generally 
triumph because the Court’s incomplete cost-benefit analysis fails to 
allocate value to constitutionalism itself.104  This balancing approach 
ignores the Supremacy Clause.  The Constitution does not declare itself the 
“supreme Law of the Land [unless the Supreme Court shall find that the 
costs it exacts are too high compared with the benefits that it provides].”105
1.  The Government-Function Argument 
  
The Supremacy Clause is the balance.  In official immunity cases, the Court 
finds that balance inconvenient, so it removes the Constitution from the 
balance in favor of the Justices’ parade of horribles. 
The most common argument supporting official immunities—the 
utilitarian argument that officials need to act without fear of civil liability if 
they violate the Constitution106
 
 101. See supra notes 7–18 and accompanying text. 
—has always seemed to me one of those 
arguments that makes sense, provided that one reads it quickly enough.  Its 
implications are remarkable.  It suggests that government cannot function 
unless its officers can act without consideration of the constitutionality of 
their conduct.  Were that true, it would be difficult to find a broader 
statement of the failure of the American experiment of government under 
law.  Of course, the implication is hyperbole of the type often employed to 
 102. The government’s most recent Supreme Court argument in favor of official 
immunity made that abundantly clear. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 16–18, Ashcroft 
v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (No. 10-98), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-98.pdf. 
 103. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 90 (“Arguments of principle are arguments intended 
to establish an individual right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to establish a 
collective goal.  Principles are propositions that describe rights; policies are propositions that 
describe goals.”). 
 104. Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a 
Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 157–58 (1984) (“[I]n that kind of calculus, 
the costs will always seem weightier than the benefits.  The benefits will be elusive, 
intangible, diffuse.  Costs will be visible and concrete:  ‘There he goes, getting away, 
someone who committed a crime!’”).  Professor Tribe wrote in response to the Court’s 
analysis in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), in which a divided Court ruled that 
evidence seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant is nonetheless admissible if the police 
have made a “reasonable” mistake. Id. at 922–23; see Tribe, supra, at 157–58.  His argument 
applies just as well to any of the areas in which the Court recognizes official immunities.  In 
all of those cases, the Court balances constitutional entitlements against non-constitutional 
considerations. 
 105. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 106. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806–07, 814 (1982); Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506–07, 512–16 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–
28 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318–21 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232, 241–42 (1974). 
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make constitutional rights less effective or ineffective.  For example, 
consider the hostility to the exclusionary rule when the Court applied it to 
the states in 1961.107  The same sort of apocalyptic commotion followed 
Miranda v. Arizona,108 which many now regard as benign and some have 
argued enhances the quality and effectiveness of law enforcement.109  
When the Court announced Marbury, President Jefferson’s view was at 
least hostile, and perhaps filled with foreboding.110  Yet, the nation has 
survived with judicial review, the exclusionary rule, and Miranda intact.111
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein’s
 
112
 
 107. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–57 (1961); Corinna Barrett Lain, 
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero?  Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal 
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1374 (2004) (“Not surprisingly, Mapp was 
less than well received in certain quarters.  Police across the country cried loudly in protest, 
blaming the decision for a burglary wave in Minneapolis (which they later attributed to lack 
of snow) and a decrease in narcotics convictions in New York.  In their view, Mapp posed a 
serious obstacle to law enforcement, one that the public might not be able to tolerate.  Those 
more solicitous of states’ rights than the Court found Mapp disturbing as well.  The President 
of the American Bar Association, for example, publicly criticized the Court for turning state 
criminal law into ‘a mere appendage of [f]ederal constitutional law’ while giving ‘inordinate 
weight’ to defendants’ rights.  With comments like that, Mapp’s holding appeared to be as 
controversial as it was consequential.  Indeed, scholars have long regarded Mapp as one of 
the two most unpopular criminal procedure decisions [with Miranda v. Arizona] in Supreme 
Court history . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 discussion of absolute prosecutorial 
immunity exemplifies both the Court’s parade of horribles technique and 
subtle substitution of an ad hoc cost-benefit analysis, divorced from 
constitutional considerations, for what should be a fundamental 
constitutional debate.  The unanimous Court invoked both the government-
 108. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Interrogation and Silence:  A 
Comparative Study, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 271, 271–72 (2009) (“Initially, the political reaction 
to Miranda in the United States (U.S.) was strong.  At a time of rising crime rates, many 
people complained that the Supreme Court was ‘handcuffing’ the police.  In 1968, Congress 
passed a statute attempting to overrule Miranda, an effort that the Supreme Court 
condemned as unconstitutional in 2000.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Lain, supra note 107, 
at 1399–1400. See generally FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 6–9, 184–85 
(1970). 
 109. GRAHAM, supra note 108, at 7 (“[S]ome law enforcement officials say that the ruling 
has improved law enforcement by making the police rely more on ‘hard’ evidence.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 310 n.1, 311 n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897) (“[T]he 
opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what 
not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the Legislature & 
Executive also, in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch.”); see also G. 
Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463, 
1484–91 (2003) (discussing contemporary reactions to Marbury). 
 111. Some might argue that the Court’s decisions since the end of the Warren Court era 
have substantially whittled away at the protection that Mapp and Miranda initially afforded 
criminal defendants. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda 
Case:  Why We Needed It, How We Got It—and What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
163, 178–84, 197–203 (2007) (canvassing the cases with which the Court has narrowed the 
protection the Warren Court had intended Miranda to provide); Sean D. Doherty, Note, The 
End of an Era:  Closing the Exclusionary Debate Under Herring v. United States, 37 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 845–53 (2009) (surveying the Court’s decisions weakening the 
protection Mapp originally provided).  I have no quarrel with that hypothesis, but discussion 
of that history is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 112. 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009). 
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function and the over-deterred-official113 arguments.114  It reiterated the 
argument from Imbler v. Pachtman115 that the public’s confidence in its 
prosecutors will suffer if the public believes prosecutors make decisions 
partly based on concern about subsequent civil suits by defendants claiming 
constitutional violations.116  Curiously, the Court did not accord the 
constitutional violations themselves any weight in the balance or think that 
prosecutors would do so.117  The Court aligned itself with the public and 
the prosecutors:  its concern was with civil suits, not with constitutional 
violations.  No one ever discusses whether it casts prosecutors, and law 
enforcement more generally, in a bad light when evidence of constitutional 
violations—especially intentional ones—surfaces.118
2.  The Over-Deterred-Official Argument 
 
The utilitarian argument also connotes that there is no way, short of 
implicitly repudiating constitutional rights, to safeguard officials’ 
willingness to exercise their powers.119
 
 113. See infra notes 120–32 and accompanying text. 
  It should go without saying that 
official power in the United States never embraces the power to violate the 
Constitution.  It is not clear why officials should be empowered to act 
without considering the constitutionality of their conduct.  Even stipulating 
 114. Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 859–60. 
 115. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
 116. Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 860 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424). 
 117. See id. 
 118. The most recent example in the Supreme Court (and one of the most egregious 
examples in history) is Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).  New Orleans 
prosecutors charged Thompson with a murder, seeking the death penalty, and an unrelated 
robbery, and obtained convictions for both in separate trials. Id. at 1356.  During the 
proceedings, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), see Connick, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1357, the prosecutors concealed evidence, such as blood from the perpetrator of the 
robbery and prior inconsistent descriptions of the perpetrator of the murder by a witness who 
testified for the prosecution at the murder trial, see id. at 1371–74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
When the concealed evidence came to light, the prosecutor’s office withdrew the robbery 
charge, and a Louisiana court ordered retrial of the murder case, in which the jury returned a 
not guilty verdict in 35 minutes. See id. at 1356–57 (majority opinion); id. at 1376 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Thompson then sought damages for his wrongful convictions, 
asserting claims under § 1983. Id. at 1357 (majority opinion).  The jury returned with a 
plaintiff’s verdict and awarded him $14 million in damages for the eighteen years he had 
spent in prison, fourteen of them on death row. Id. at 1355, 1357.  The Supreme Court did 
not dispute the jury’s findings, but reversed on the grounds of municipal immunity. Id. at 
1359–60, 1365–66.  Given the underlying facts, it is not clear why the prosecutors who 
participated directly in Thompson’s criminal cases could not be charged with attempted 
murder under Louisiana law. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:27, 14:30.1 (2007).  For 
another shocking example, consider Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(detailing allegations of a police investigation that involved coercion of child witnesses, 
deliberate misrepresentations by police to children and parents and other constitutional 
violations of defendants’ rights that, although the court was unable to grant habeas corpus 
relief because of the one-year limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), caused the court strongly 
to recommend that the district attorney reinvestigate the case). 
 119. See, e.g., Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 (arguing that “harassment by unfounded litigation 
would cause a deflection of the prosecutors energies from his public duties, and the 
possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of 
judgment required by his public trust”). 
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that is a desirable outcome (at least in some extreme circumstances that 
demand instantaneous action), one can relieve officials’ anxiety by having 
their governments provide a defense for them and indemnity to them if a 
court finds they have committed a transgression. 
Some jurisdictions do that.  In 1976, New York specifically provided 
such relief,120 with some limitations that are particularly instructive because 
they echo common law practice.  If an official acts outside the laws or 
instructions of her employer, she stands before the law as an individual.121  
If she acts within those constraints, even if a court subsequently finds that 
her actions have violated federal law that was obligatory upon the employer 
by supremacy, the employer shoulders the burden of defense and 
liability.122
It is a market system in microcosm.  The employer will not countenance 
the employee violating the employer’s rules.  Within those rules, it wants 
the employee to act without fear of adverse personal consequences 
stemming from the violations of federal law, so it agrees to pay for the 
privilege.  It releases the employee from having to anticipate new 
developments in the federal law before acting.  One hopes that in all clear 
cases, officials will be aware of federal law and will conform their conduct.  
The statute offers relief in close cases, where official action consonant with 
state law may nonetheless violate federal law, though it is not clear whether 
it does.
 
123
New York did not invent that idea.  Congress did, more than 160 years 
earlier.
  So there is a way to ensure that officials invested with discretion 
will not hesitate to exercise it. 
124  From the nation’s beginning through at least the mid-nineteenth 
century, the assumption was that individuals should and did have effective 
remedies for injuries suffered from official misconduct.125  A scholarly 
canvass of early American cases concluded that it was the truly exceptional 
case in which the plaintiff could not recover for official wrongdoing.126  
Recovery ostensibly came from the official, but Congress passed private 
bills authorizing indemnity (as, apparently, almost everyone expected).127
 
 120. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k (McKinney 2007). 
  
“[W]hile the right to indemnity was understood in contractual terms, the 
practice of securing a determination of the right to indemnity almost 
 121. See id. § 50-k(2). 
 122. Id.  Section 50-k(5) relieves the employer of its burdens if the offense occurs while 
the employee is subject to a departmental disciplinary proceeding and if he is not exonerated. 
Id. § 50-k(5). 
 123. The Supreme Court has taken governments off the hook in such situations by 
abolishing official liability unless the constitutional right asserted is “clearly established.” 
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see supra notes 98–99 and accompanying 
text.  In this respect, the New York legislature acted more responsibly than the Supreme 
Court by recognizing that constitutional injury deserves redress. 
 124. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 76, at 1866–67, 1888 (explaining that Congress 
provided indemnification through private legislation). 
 125. See id. at 1929–30. 
 126. See id. at 1904–14. 
 127. See id. at 1911–12. 
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invariably entailed the submission of a petition to Congress for the adoption 
of private legislation.”128
“Congress applied established agency theory in determining whether to 
grant relief.”
 
129  In effect, the early Congress accepted respondeat superior 
liability, an interesting contrast to the modern Court’s view that the 
Reconstruction Congresses would never have contemplated such liability 
for municipalities it had subjected to the Civil Rights Act of 1871.130
Congress concluded that the government should bear responsibility for the 
loss; the [officials] were acting as honest agents of the government in 
taking the action that led to the imposition of liability.  When, by way of 
contrast, the government official acted outside the scope of his agency or 
beyond the authority conferred by law or his instructions, the officer was 
left to bear any resulting liability on his own.
  
Before the Civil War, when officials had acted in accord with their 
instructions and in good faith, 
131
Private legislation provided indemnity about 60 percent of the time the 
official found liable sought such relief.
 
132
3.  The Inconvenient Hierarchy 
  In contrast, the modern Court 
has substituted its own poorly disguised policy judgment that the 
community should not bear the cost of its agents’ constitutional errors; the 
victim of the unconstitutional conduct should. 
Most important, immunities upset the hierarchy the Supremacy Clause 
establishes.  As Butz v. Economou133 pointed out, “the doctrine of official 
immunity from § 1983 liability . . . [is] not constitutionally grounded.”134  
If any immunity other than legislative immunity rests on a constitutional 
basis, attorneys representing officials seem at some pains to conceal it.  
During oral argument in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,135 the Acting Solicitor General 
conceded that the Court’s absolute immunity doctrines are of less than 
constitutional stature.136  Justice Alito asked why, if former Attorney 
General Ashcroft’s conduct was lawful under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court should decide the question of absolute immunity.  Counsel 
responded:  “I think that’s the way this Court has historically gone about it, 
probably for reasons of constitutional avoidance, to not reach constitutional 
questions if there’s an absolute immunity question.”137
 
 128. Id. at 1866. 
  If applying 
 129. Id. at 1906. 
 130. See infra notes 187–99 and accompanying text. 
 131. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 76, at 1907. 
 132. See id. at 1867. 
 133. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
 134. Id. at 497 (emphasis added) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)); accord 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975) (“We think there must be a degree of 
immunity if the work of the schools is to go forward.”). 
 135. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
 136. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 102, at 9. 
 137. Id. 
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immunity doctrine is constitutional avoidance,138 then immunity itself 
cannot be constitutional doctrine.139
The Court has flirted with this reasoning, but the decisions it makes 
supporting officials’ insulation from actions for damages are inconsistent 
with its statements of constitutional principle.  For example, in Economou, 
the majority noted “the general rule, which long prevailed, that a federal 
official may not with impunity ignore the limitations which the controlling 
law has placed on his powers.”
  That calls into question the legitimacy 
of any immunity (whether individual or governmental) that the Constitution 
does not establish.  On what principled basis can sub-constitutional doctrine 
trump constitutional rights? 
140  The Court also mentioned the 
longstanding rule that a federal official acting in excess of his “federal 
statutory authority” was liable for “his trespassory acts.”141  A fortiori,142 
official violations of the Constitution should be subject to judicial remedy, 
as Economou recognized:  “Since an unconstitutional act, even if authorized 
by statute, was viewed as not authorized in contemplation of law, there 
could be no immunity defense.”143
Having championed legal supremacy, and having relied explicitly upon 
both Lee and Marbury for the proposition that “all individuals, whatever 
their position in government, are subject to federal law,”
 
144
 
 138. Justice Brandeis explained this doctrine in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936): 
 the Court 
promptly forgot its own lesson.  It reaffirmed qualified immunity for federal 
executive officials, resting not on constitutional principle or the political 
philosophy that underlies it, but on naked expediency:  reasons of public 
policy, which Justice White elaborated with respect to participants in the 
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented 
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may 
be disposed of.  This rule has found most varied application.  Thus, if a case can be 
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other 
a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the 
latter. 
Id. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 139. Of course, states’ general immunity from suit by an individual in federal court, see 
U.S. CONST. amend. XI, despite all of its uncertainties and fuzzy boundaries, see infra note 
184 and accompanying text, is of constitutional stature. 
 140. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 489 (1978). 
 141. Id. at 490. 
 142. See id. at 495 (“[I]f [federal officials] are accountable when they stray beyond the 
plain limits of their statutory authority, it would be incongruous to hold that they may 
nevertheless willfully or knowingly violate constitutional rights without fear of liability.”). 
 143. Id. at 490–91 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218–23 (1882)).  In fact, the 
Court advanced several powerful arguments explaining why absolute immunity for executive 
officials is antithetical to constitutional supremacy. See, e.g., id. at 505 (“If, as the 
Government argues, all officials exercising discretion were exempt from personal liability, a 
suit under the Constitution could provide no redress to the injured citizen, nor would it in 
any degree deter federal officials from committing constitutional wrongs.  Moreover, no 
compensation would be available from the Government, for the Tort Claims Act prohibits 
recovery for injuries stemming from discretionary acts, even when that discretion has been 
abused.” (footnote omitted)). 
 144. Economou, 438 U.S. at 506. 
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judicial process generally.145  He argued that safeguards within the judicial 
process make remedies external to it less necessary.146
Economou rested explicitly on Imbler, Scheuer v. Rhodes,
  He did not say that 
such remedies were unnecessary, leaving one to wonder about the 
apparently non-constitutional balance the Court uses to ignore 
constitutional rights when the judicial process’s internal restraints fail to 
protect them. 
147 Wood, and 
Pierson v. Ray.148  Regrettably—perhaps predictably—none of those cases 
mention any constitutional principle that allows an immunity not found in 
the Constitution to prevent enforcement of a right that is.  Pierson involved 
immunity for a state judge, and the Court held only that the Civil Rights 
Act149 did not abolish judges’ common law immunity from civil suit for 
performance of their judicial duties.150  It did not discuss whether that is 
compatible with the Constitution.  The Court later held that the criminal 
counterpart to § 1983 recognized no immunity.151
Scheuer came down seven years after Pierson and, although Harlow 
discarded it, the majority opinion remains of interest because of its 
argument for official immunities and their historical background.  Chief 
Justice Burger noted that official immunities find their roots in the same 
considerations as sovereign immunity, identifying two “mutually dependent 
rationales”: 
 
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to 
liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, 
to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would 
deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the 
judgment required by the public good.152
The first assumes away something Professor Dworkin identified:  
“Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left 
open by a surrounding belt of restriction.”
 
153  The Court spoke of discretion 
as if it were free-floating, untethered to the limits of the power that the law 
confers.  It committed the classic error of keeping its eye upon the hole and 
ignoring the doughnut.  Chief Justice Marshall spoke more than two 
hundred years ago about duty and discretion: 
 
 145. See id. at 506–07. 
[W]hat is there in the exalted station of the officer, which shall bar a 
citizen from asserting, in a court of justice, his legal rights, or shall forbid 
a court to listen to the claim, or to issue a mandamus, directing the 
 146. See id. at 512. 
 147. 416 U.S. 232 (1974), abrogated by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 148. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 150. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553–54. 
 151. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 152. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240.  The Chief Justice did not comment on the possible 
injustice of leaving an individual who has suffered constitutional injury without remedy. 
 153. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 31. 
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performance of a duty, not depending on executive discretion, but on 
particular acts of congress and the general principles of law?154
Discretion cannot justify violating constitutional rights.  It is important 
that Scheuer traced its rationale back to sovereign immunity.  It is more 
important that it overlooked the maxim that the King can do no wrong,
 
155 
upon which the Court had partially relied in Ex parte Young156:  “The State 
has no power to impart to [an official] any immunity from responsibility to 
the supreme authority of the United States.”157
Yet, the whole thrust of an immunity is that it excuses violation of a 
right, not that it abrogates or modifies the right.
  Neither the Supreme Court, 
acting as a common law court in creating sub-constitutional immunities, nor 
Congress, enacting statutes, has such power. 
158  The immunity cases do 
not purport to narrow the scope of the constitutional rights plaintiffs assert.  
Scheuer did not say that the Fourteenth Amendment entitlement to 
protection from state deprivation of life or liberty was any narrower than the 
plaintiffs claimed.  Compare that decision with Paul v. Davis,159 where the 
Court did say that Davis’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest did not 
protect reputation simpliciter.160
This leads to another mistake the Court makes repeatedly in civil rights 
actions, most often under 
 
§ 1983, to enforce constitutional rights.  Professor 
Tribe might have catalogued it as an eighth deadly sin (although it would 
have ruined his article’s title):  the sin of asking the wrong question.161  The 
Court repeatedly asks whether Congress, enacting § 1983, intended to 
abrogate common law immunities.162
First, as the Court acknowledged in Imbler, § 1983 is silent about 
immunities.
  There are three reasons this is the 
wrong question. 
163
 
 154. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
  After acknowledging that silence, Justice Powell pointed 
 155. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. 
 156. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 157. Id. at 160. 
 158. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 159. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
 160. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  Paul distinguished Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), as having held that where government defamation also 
cuts off exercise of a state privilege, it is actionable under § 1983. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 
708–09. 
 161. See generally Tribe, supra note 104. 
 162. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (“Did Congress by the general 
language of its 1871 statute mean to overturn the tradition of legislative freedom achieved in 
England by Civil War and carefully preserved in the formation of State and National 
Governments here?”); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976) (“The decision 
in Tenney established that § 1983 is to be read in harmony with general principles of tort 
immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.”); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 
308, 317 (1975) (citing Tenney for the proposition that “there was no basis for believing that 
Congress intended to eliminate the traditional immunity of legislators from civil liability for 
acts done within their sphere of legislative action.”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 
(1967) (“The legislative record [of § 1983] gives no clear indication that Congress meant to 
abolish wholesale all common law immunities.”). 
 163. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417. 
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out in the next breath that “[this] view has not prevailed.”164  He framed the 
issue instead as “whether the Reconstruction Congress had intended to 
restrict the availability in § 1983 suits of those immunities which 
historically, and for reasons of public policy, had been accorded to various 
categories of officials.”165  The Court’s approach assumes that Congress 
could constitutionally enact a statute making a constitutional right 
unenforceable.  This overlooks that § 1983 does not concern itself with the 
existence vel non of any substantive right or any immunity.166  The 
Constitution and statutes other than § 1983 create the rights.  The Court has 
created the immunities, apparently based on the unstated hypothesis167 that 
the Framers silently chose to leave in place a supposed immunity structure 
that made the United States government even less accountable for 
violations of fundamental rights than the British monarchy had been.168  
Given that several states’ documents ratifying the Constitution included 
specific proposed amendments to protect fundamental rights, some of 
which promptly found their way into the Bill of Rights,169
Second, there is a historical problem with the Court’s analysis.  Consider 
the state officials the 1871 Congress had in mind when it passed § 1983.  
Think of the conditions that prevailed in 1871 and impelled Congress to act.  
Monroe v. Pape
 that hypothesis is 
extraordinarily unlikely. 
170
 
 164. Id. 
 discussed them at some length, focusing not merely on 
violence attributable to the Ku Klux Klan but repeatedly on the states’ 
 165. Id. at 417–18. 
 166. See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979). 
 167. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 168. The colonists’ rights as English citizens included remedies for official misconduct, 
both against the officials and against the Crown. See supra notes 19–26, 54–63 and 
accompanying text. 
 169. See, e.g., Resolution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1788), in 2 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 93; Ratification Document of the State of New 
York (1788), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 190.  Explicitly recognizing the 
states’ concerns, Congress rapidly proposed a dozen amendments, ten of which became the 
Bill of Rights. See Resolution of Congress Proposing Amendatory Articles to the Several 
States, 1 Stat. 97 (1789), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 321 
(quoting Congress’s resolution, explaining that it proposed the Bill of Rights because “[the] 
Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, 
expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further 
declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added:  And as extending the ground of public 
confidence in the Government, will best ensure the beneficent ends of its institution.”); see 
also BOWEN, supra note 9, at 245 (noting that “nothing created such an uproar [about 
ratification] as the lack of a bill of rights.”).  Americans’ interest in a bill of rights antedated 
the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation, and even the outbreak of open hostilities in 
the Revolution. See MAIER, supra note 39, at 245 (noting interest in an American Bill of 
Rights recognized by England as a way of mending the split between the colonies and 
England).  Interestingly, the Constitutional Convention had considered a bill of rights, but 
then rejected it as unnecessary. See BOWEN, supra note 9, at 244–45 & note.  Some Framers 
believed “the Constitution covered the matter as it stood.” Id. at 245.  Alexander Hamilton 
went further, arguing that “a bill of rights . . . . would be dangerous” because there was no 
need to “‘declare that things shall not be done which there is no power [in Congress] to do.’” 
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 170. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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inability or unwillingness to enforce the law, depriving citizens of equal 
protection of the laws.171  The Court in Wood, however, asks us to believe 
that the 1871 Congress was greatly concerned with retaining immunity 
from constitutional suit for officials responsible for enforcing the law who 
failed or refused to do so or who themselves violated the Constitution:  
“Common law tradition, recognized in our prior decisions, and strong 
public-policy reasons also lead to a construction of § 1983 extending a 
qualified good-faith immunity to school board members from liability from 
damages under that section.”172  That is also an unlikely hypothesis.  Given 
that § 1983 clearly targets state officials violating federal rights “under 
color of any law . . . of any State,”173
The Court has written strongly about 
 providing or assuming immunities 
would have undermined Congress’s purpose. 
§ 1983’s remedial scope and 
Congress’s clear intentions.  In Mitchum v. Foster,174 the Court noted that 
“[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between 
the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights—to 
protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 
‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.’”175  There was 
no dissent.  Given that background, the modern Court’s creation of 
immunities for the persons and entities whose actions (or inactions) so 
clearly concerned and motivated the 1871 Congress (not to mention the 
Court’s attribution of those immunities to an invisible congressional intent) 
would be laughable if the consequences were not so serious.176
 
 171. Id. at 172–76. 
  Professor 
 172. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975).  Given the post-Civil War context, it 
is natural to conclude that uppermost in the Reconstruction Congresses’ minds was the 
vexing problem of immunity for local school and school board officials. 
 173. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)). 
 174. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).  Mitchum concerned whether a federal court could enjoin a 
state court from proceeding in a pending public nuisance action under § 1983 without 
running afoul of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006). 
 175. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)) 
(emphasis added).  The Court also quoted extensively from the congressional debates on 
§ 1983’s predecessor. See id. at 240–41.  It would be misleading, however, to consider 
Mitchum in isolation from Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), whose holding the 
Mitchum Court expressly preserved. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243.  The Younger majority 
argued that Congress had not intended § 1983 to subordinate “the national policy forbidding 
federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special 
circumstances.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 41.  Curiously, the Court cited—but did not rely on—
the Anti-Injunction Act, which exempts injunctions that Congress had “expressly 
authorized.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283; see Younger, 401 U.S. at 43, 54.  Instead, it reasoned that 
federalism considerations counseled the federal courts to exercise restraint in enjoining state 
courts, especially pending state criminal proceedings. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–45, 52–54.  
Perhaps the Justices anticipated Mitchum’s holding that § 1983 is an “expressly authorized” 
exception to § 2283, see Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242–43; one cannot know.  For present 
purposes, the important thing is that cases involving official immunities are civil damage 
actions; they do not involve enjoining the pending state criminal prosecutions at issue in 
Younger.  That abstention doctrine and its underlying rationale are not at issue in the official 
immunity cases. 
 176. The immunities should be an especially uncomfortable bone in the throat of those 
Justices who consider themselves to be originalists in whole or in part. 
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Zeigler’s extensive research on the legislative history of the civil rights bills 
of the late 1860s and early 1870s amply documents Congress’s quite self-
conscious intent to authorize federal actions against state officials, 
including judges, who participated in constitutional violations.177
Third, the Court overlooks that § 1983 is only part of the story of 
protecting civil rights during Reconstruction.  Congress had earlier passed a 
statute providing criminal penalties for violating citizens’ federal rights 
under color of state law
 
178 and amended it in 1874 to include some of the 
critical language from § 1983.179  The Court’s cases concerning the 
criminal section do not even hint at the existence of any immunity.180  
Neither statute mentions immunities, and so neither gives any indication of 
congressional intent to embody the common law immunities the Court 
repeatedly asserts were so well established.  Yet, the Court interprets 
congressional silence implicitly to adopt common law immunity defenses in 
the civil arena (§ 1983) and to dispense with them in the criminal arena 
(§ 242), thus providing broader protection of constitutional rights under the 
criminal statute.181
C.  Municipal Immunity 
 
Given the preceding discussion of sovereign and official immunities, it 
will not be a stretch for the reader to infer the following view of municipal 
immunity.  Monell v. Department of Social Services182 reinterpreted § 1983 
to include municipalities within § 1983’s concept of “person.”183  It did not 
take long for the immunity question to arise; Owen v. City of 
Independence184
 
 177. See generally Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light 
of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987. 
 reached the Court two years after Monell.  A five-to-four 
Court held that there was no qualified immunity for the municipality and 
 178. See The Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, reenacted and amended by Act of 
May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140 (following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment) (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006)). 
 179. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 99 (1945) (noting that the 1874 
amendment added “the prohibition against the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States,’” which 
was borrowed from § 1983). 
 180. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997); United States v. Price, 
383 U.S. 787 (1966). 
 181. I had always thought that courts construed criminal statutes narrowly, see, e.g., 
Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1891 (2009), and remedial statutes 
liberally, see, e.g., Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (1 
Wall.) 493, 504 (1870) (“The statute is a remedial one and should be construed liberally to 
carry out the wise and salutary purposes of its enactment.”). 
 182. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 183. In this respect, Monell overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which had 
held the exact opposite only seventeen years earlier. Monell, 436 U.S. at 663. 
 184. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). 
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that the qualified immunity of its officials did not extend to the municipality 
itself185 because there was no common law immunity for municipalities.186
However, Monell created a quasi-immunity by declining to allow 
respondeat superior liability, limiting liability to more direct municipal 
action.
 
187  Justice Brennan’s painstaking analysis of § 1983’s legislative 
history noted that Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment, which 
would have made municipalities liable “for damage done to the person or 
property of its inhabitants by private persons ‘riotously and tumultuously 
assembled.’”188  That led the Court to conclude that Congress implicitly 
forbade respondeat superior liability for much the same reasons.189
Rejection of the Sherman Amendment rested on Congress’s 
unwillingness to impose peacekeeping duties on municipalities because 
municipalities did not commonly have police forces.
  Yet that 
conclusion is at least highly questionable. 
190  In Congress’s 
view, municipalities had no duty to control the Ku Klux Klan or other 
mobs.191  On the other hand, municipalities are principals to their agents 
and principals have a duty to control their own agents;192
 
 185. Id. at 638–50.  Dean Chemerinsky thinks that “[t]he Court’s reasoning in Owen is 
open to criticism.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.5.3, at 523 (5th ed. 
2007).  Perhaps so, but its holding remains the law because the Court has not overruled it. 
 making 
municipalities liable under § 1983 for their agents’ official misconduct 
would not have imposed any new duty.  Professor Achtenberg views 
Congress’s failure to enact the Sherman Amendment not as rejecting 
respondeat superior, but rather as affirming the concepts that underlie the 
 186. Owen, 445 U.S. at 638.  On the other hand, in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 
453 U.S. 247 (1981), the Court ruled that § 1983 did not expose municipalities to punitive 
damages because municipalities were not liable for those damages at common law. Id. at 
259–71. 
 187. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95 (“We conclude, therefore, that a local government may 
not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.  Instead, it 
is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by 
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury 
that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”). 
 188. Id. at 664 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 749 (1871)). 
 189. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 185, at 510; David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History 
Seriously:  Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat 
Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2196 (2005). 
 190. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 670 n.21. 
 191. See id. 
 192. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b, at 141 (2006) (explaining that 
a principal is liable for an agent’s torts within the scope of their employment only if the 
principal has the right to control the agent’s actions). 
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doctrine.193  Nonetheless, Monell ruled the other way, and there has been no 
retreat from that holding.194
In one way, the Court has strengthened that part of Monell.  Pembaur v. 
City of Cincinnati
 
195 held that decisions of municipal officials with “final 
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered” 
qualified as municipal action.196  More recently, Board of County 
Commissioners v. Brown197 effectively (though not explicitly) overruled 
Pembaur:  the Court decided that it was not sufficient that the municipal 
agent was a policymaker and had made a single decision.198  Instead, the 
majority ruled that if the official decision was not itself unconstitutional, the 
plaintiff in a § 1983 action had to “show that the municipal action was 
taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct 
causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal 
rights.”199
Municipal immunity suffers from the same hierarchical difficulty as 
official immunities.  To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, Congress has no 
power to declare exemptions from the supremacy of the Constitution under 
Article VI, and no clause in the Constitution confers such a power on the 
federal courts.
  As a result, it became far more difficult for the policymaker’s 
isolated decision to cast the municipality in liability, as it had in Pembaur. 
200  Congress also lacks the power to declare either that a 
constitutional provision is more or less inclusive than the Supreme Court 
says it is,201 or to overturn judicial constitutional decisions by statute.202  
Although the Court ruled almost two centuries ago that the Bill of Rights 
did not apply to non-federal officials or entities,203
 
 193. See Achtenberg, supra note 189, at 2196–97.  He observes that Monell used a 
twentieth-century lens to analyze a statute enacted against the backdrop of a nineteenth-
century understanding of respondeat superior. See id. at 2198 (“[H]owever arcane or illogical 
the legal unity concept may have seemed to members of the Court in 1978 when Monell was 
written, it was a familiar legal truism to members of Congress in 1871 when § 1983 was 
enacted.”); id. at 2199 (“[T]he Monell Court, writing more than one hundred years later, 
anachronistically discounted control as a justification for employer liability.”). 
 by now, almost all the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, incorporated through the Fourteenth 
 194. Several Justices have suggested reconsidering Monell for exactly the reasons that 
Professor Achtenberg points out. See Achtenberg, supra note 189, at 2196; see also Bd. of 
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430–37 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 195. 475 U.S. 469 (1986). 
 196. Id. at 481. 
 197. 520 U.S. 397 (1997). 
 198. Id. at 404. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  Justice Brandeis was 
addressing the legitimacy of the federal courts creating common law in areas in which 
Congress lacked legislative authority.  The argument applies by analogy but with even 
greater force here because of (supposed) constitutional supremacy. 
 201. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20, 527–29 (1997). 
 202. The Supreme Court made the latter unmistakably clear in Dickerson v. United States, 
530 U.S. 428 (2000), holding that Congress’s attempt to overrule Miranda—by passing a 
law purporting to make voluntariness the only standard for a confession’s admissibility, see 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, § 701(a), 82 Stat. 
197, 210 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2006))—was unavailing and effectively 
unconstitutional, see Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441–44. 
 203. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247–48, 250–52 (1833). 
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause, do apply to state and local governments 
and officials.204
CONCLUSION 
  The Supremacy Clause prevents any state or local 
government from opting out of the commands of those provisions. 
The Supremacy Clause binds the Court every bit as much as it binds 
Congress, the President, the states, their localities and their officials.  If a 
municipality violates constitutional rights, no branch of state or federal 
government has the power to excuse that violation.  Only two legitimate 
possibilities exist to allow the government, its officials, and municipalities 
to avoid liability.  First, the Supreme Court can declare that the 
constitutional right itself is not broad enough to reach the municipal 
conduct.  Second, Congress and the states can invoke the constitutional 
amendment procedure of Article V. 
With regard to the first possibility, the Court has declined to interpret the 
constitutional rights narrowly in any of the immunity cases, whether dealing 
with official or municipal immunities.205  In fact, its veneration of common 
law immunity doctrines shows no signs of abating, and in the past decade, 
the Court has radically moved away from interpreting the constitutional 
rights themselves.  In 2001, Saucier v. Katz206 directed the federal courts in 
qualified immunity cases to consider whether “the facts alleged show that 
the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” before considering 
whether the constitutional right asserted was well enough established to 
avoid the qualified immunity defense.207  The Court explained why that 
sequence was important: 
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated 
on the premises alleged, a court might find it necessary to set forth 
principles which will become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly 
established.  This is the process for the law’s elaboration from case to 
case, and it is one reason for our insisting upon turning to the existence or 
nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first inquiry.  The law might 
be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the 
question whether the law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was 
unlawful in the circumstances of the case.208 
Thus, after Saucier, accretion of individual constitutional rights might 
still occur.  Then, in 2009, Pearson v. Callahan209 made Saucier’s 
mandated sequence of inquiry optional.210
 
 204. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§§ 10.2, 11.6, at 396–99, 462–67 (7th ed. 2004). 
  Late in its 2010 Term, the Court 
further strengthened officials’ insulation from constitutional obligation.  In 
 205. See supra notes 134–59 and accompanying text. 
 206. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 207. Id. at 201. 
 208. Id. 
 209. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 210. Id. at 236. 
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Camreta v. Greene,211 the Ninth Circuit had found that the defendant 
officials had committed a Fourth Amendment violation but that “qualified 
immunity shielded the officials from monetary liability because the 
constitutional right at issue was not clearly established under existing 
law.”212  The Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the officials.213  Despite their victory, the officials 
sought and received Supreme Court review,214 after which the Court 
“vacate[d] the part of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion that addressed [the Fourth 
Amendment] issue, and remand[ed] for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.”215 
Camreta, by reviewing and vacating part of an opinion216 at the behest of 
the prevailing party below, appears to be the death blow to the Saucier 
sequence and to the prospect of “the law’s elaboration from case to case” 
that only a decade ago seemed so important to the Court.217  Furthermore, 
six justices in both Camreta and al-Kidd,218 another immunity case decided 
in the 2010 Term, expressed their preference for deciding issues on 
immunity grounds rather than the Constitution.219
 
 211. 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
  If the Court has 
 212. Id. at 2026. 
 213. Id. at 2027. 
 214. That the Court allowed itself to review the case raises myriad issues relating to 
standing, mootness, and advisory opinions, as the Justices’ opinions discussed.  Fortunately, 
all of those issues are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 215. Id. at 2036.  Of course, the only thing consistent with the Court’s opinion was the 
summary judgment for the defendant officials, which the Ninth Circuit had affirmed in the 
first place. See id. at 2027. 
 216. As Justice Kennedy’s dissent pointed out, the Court has said before that it sits to 
review judgments, not opinions. Id. at 2037 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting California v. 
Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311 (1987) (per curiam)).  Justice Kennedy also quoted from Herb v. 
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945): 
“[O]ur power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions.  We are not 
permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be 
rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review 
could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.” 
Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2037–38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Pitcairn, 324 U.S. at 
125–26).  It is difficult to see how the Camreta decision is anything but advisory.  See supra 
note 215 and accompanying text. 
 217. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
 218. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).  The al-Kidd case involved a Bivens 
action against former Attorney General John Ashcroft, alleging that he authorized federal 
officials to misuse the Material Witness Statute and arrest suspected terrorists without 
probable cause. See id. at 2079.  The Ninth Circuit decided that the complaint alleged a 
Fourth Amendment violation and that neither qualified nor absolute prosecutorial immunity 
was available because the constitutional violation was clearly established. Id.  A majority of 
the Supreme Court reversed both the determination that the allegations constituted a 
constitutional violation and the ruling that the violation was clearly established. See id. at 
2080, 2085. 
 219. See id. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“objecting to the Court’s disposition of al-
Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim on the merits . . . [because] that claim involves novel and 
trying questions that will ‘have no effect on the outcome of th[is] case’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–37 (2009))); id. at 2089–90 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (same); Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2036 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(expressing a willingness “to end the extraordinary practice of ruling upon constitutional 
questions unnecessarily when the defendant possesses qualified immunity . . . in an 
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completely abandoned Saucier, it is easy to see how individual 
constitutional rights may diminish if the Court contracts the previously 
understood scope of a constitutional provision to avoid an official’s 
liability.  It is hard to see how the Court’s rejection of Saucier will allow 
more expansive understandings of constitutional rights.220
Since the Court has not used the immunity cases to narrow its 
interpretation of the underlying constitutional rights,
 
221 the only legitimate 
way to limit their scope is by constitutional amendment.  Sub-constitutional 
immunity doctrines for governments and their officials violate 
constitutional supremacy.  If the Constitution declares a right or a 
limitation, only another constitutional provision can alter it or set it aside.  
Congress could not legislate an end to Prohibition; it took another 
amendment.222
That is why all of the Court-created immunities to constitutional claims 
are structurally illegitimate.  The Constitution provides two immunities, 
which we must respect or undo through amendment.  The Speech and 
Debate Clause
  The Court asks the wrong question when it considers 
whether Congress intended to set aside what the Court characterizes as 
unquestioned common law immunities.  Even if § 1983 did indicate its 
congressional support for such immunities, it would be irrelevant.  The 
rights come from the Constitution; neither the common law nor a mere 
statute can overrule or modify constitutional provisions. 
223 immunizes federal legislators, and the Eleventh 
Amendment224 confers some sort of immunity on the states against being 
made defendants at the suit of individuals in a federal forum.225
 
appropriate case”); id. at 2043 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting, with Justice Thomas, that 
“[i]f today’s decision proves to be more than an isolated anomaly, the Court might find it 
necessary to reconsider its special permission that the Courts of Appeals may issue 
unnecessary merits determinations in qualified immunity cases with binding precedential 
effect”). 
  No other 
immunity finds mention.  Why not? 
 220. Camreta seems to eliminate the possibility of any accretion of constitutional rights 
happening in civil suits.  The only possibility for expansion lies in defense of criminal 
actions, yet this may be extraordinarily difficult.  At issue in Camreta was a warrantless 
interview with a child at her school by a state child protective services worker and a deputy 
sheriff.  They sought evidence of abuse by the child’s father. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 
2027.  The state charged the father with abuse but was unable to obtain a conviction. Id.  If 
the state had sought to introduce evidence from the interview against the father in the 
criminal proceeding, he would have lacked standing to object on Fourth Amendment 
grounds. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104–05 (1980) (holding that 
defendant must show he personally possessed “a legitimate expectation of privacy in” the 
searched item); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34, 139–40 (1977) (“A person who is 
aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging 
evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of his 
Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”). 
 221. See supra notes 135–59, 205–15 and accompanying text. 
 222. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 223. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 224. Id. amend. XI. 
 225. It is not possible to simplify Eleventh Amendment law; one can only over-simplify 
it.  It is not even possible to say whether the Eleventh Amendment concerns federal subject 
matter jurisdiction (not waivable) or a state immunity (waivable).  The Supreme Court has 
attributed both aspects to it, and in the same case. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 
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The Court views the immunity cases in a hypothetical vacuum because 
the Court considers them without reference to the historical context in 
which the individual rights came into existence.  It tries to predict what 
might happen if it decides against the immunity the governmental defendant 
asserts.  The colonists fought the revolution because of their pervasive 
feeling that the English government under George III denied them the rights 
of Englishmen.226  They rebelled against arbitrary and unlawful 
government action against the colonies as entities and against the colonists 
as individuals.227  They complained that the courts were beholden only to 
the King and disregarded legal injuries the colonists suffered.228  After they 
finally formed a lasting national government in 1787, one of the first things 
they did was to add the Bill of Rights.  Several states’ ratification 
documents had urged swift drafting, presentation, and ratification of a bill 
of rights.229
Against that background, I must borrow Robert Bolt’s language from his 
play about Sir Thomas More.
 
230  Is it probable that after so long a struggle 
against the Crown’s denial of the rights of Englishmen, the people who 
created the new nation would have established governments not 
accountable for violations of fundamental individual rights?  Is it probable 
that having urged the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, the 
people would have made those rights unenforceable against governments 
and officials who violated them?  Is it probable that people who had 
suffered from a government that had refused to honor the established law of 
the land231
As I wrote at the outset,
 would immediately adopt a Constitution that did not bind the 
government or its officials to respect the individual rights that the colonists 
had asserted for so long and had paid so dearly to secure? 
232
 
651, 673–78 (1974) (discussing states’ ability to waive their Eleventh Amendment protection 
(though not finding a waiver) while overturning the Court of Appeals’ refusal to honor the 
state’s invocation of the Eleventh Amendment for the first time at the appellate level).  A full 
examination of this issue is beyond this Article’s scope. 
 the Constitution has only two purposes:  to 
create government and to restrain it.  The Constitution cannot enforce itself; 
it depends on a government responsive to its philosophy and sensitive to its 
limitations.  When the Court recognizes common law immunity doctrines, it 
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 227. See, e.g., id. paras. 4–8. 
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 229. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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while imprisoned and denied Parliament’s power to declare King Henry VIII the head of the 
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 231. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (referring to the king’s 
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makes the Constitution less than the “supreme Law of the Land.”233  It does 
not even pretend to do so on the basis of any law or principle that rises to a 
constitutional level.234  Even more, it reduces the rights-declaring portions 
of the Constitution to not being law at all.  If something is not enforceable, 
it is not a law.  A right declared but unenforceable is not a right.  If 
individuals’ rights are not enforceable against the governments and 
government officials who violate them, then to whom do they apply, and 
whom do they protect?  The Court’s immunity doctrines read those rights 
out of the Constitution.  They repudiate the rule of law.235
Justice Brandeis memorably cautioned about the signal importance of 
government obeying the Constitution: 
 
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if 
it fails to observe the law scrupulously.  Our Government is the potent, 
the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people 
by its example.  Crime is contagious.  If the Government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a 
law unto himself; it invites anarchy.  To declare that in the administration 
of the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare that the 
Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a 
private criminal—would bring terrible retribution.  Against that 
pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.236
Justice Brandeis also reminded
 
237 us about Chief Justice Marshall’s 
famous admonition:  “[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are 
expounding.”238
 
  By its repeated ventures into the sub-constitutional 
doctrines of official immunities, the Court has done precisely what the 
Chief Justice feared:  it has forgotten. 
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